How Somalia can sustain victory against al-Shabaab

EDITORIAL - Somalis are waking up to a new trend where villagers, tired of al-Shabaab and its dosage of atrocities, defend their turf, much like ambushing the terrorists in their game.

This trend made it into the speech of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud at the UN General Assembly in New York when he praised ordinary folk for refusing to cooperate with al-Shabaab.

“We are now confident that with enhanced public support, our Government will eliminate terrorism from Somalia,” he told the global audience on Thursday, promising that his administration is “fully committed to doing the heavy lifting to secure our future.”

Anyone aware of al-Shabaab’s history of maiming, looting, and killing will be thankful that we are turning a page against a horrendous group of devils, which is why we appreciate the volunteers teaming up in vigilante groups and supporting the national army to defeat the terrorists.

It is amazing to see villages previously inaccessible in Hirshabelle and South West now being accessed by land. Villagers in those areas can travel freely without looking over their shoulders, and they are not being compelled to pay extortion fees. Finally, Somalia has shown that the cost of beating down al-Shabaab can be lower than expected if the people are on their side. The most significant sign on the wall for President Mohamud is excellent approval for his administration from the ordinary folk. He can leverage this to turn around the fortunes of a country known for decades as a graveyard.

Depending on how we plan for it, however, these may be short or long-term benefits. The danger will be celebrating the initial victories and forgetting that this is a war with many battles.

And the first lesson for Somalia is that the real strategy for Counterinsurgency must be employed. Known as COIN in military circles, it helps militaries retain the territories they liberate from the enemy, even as the war continues.

In Somalia, the problem often blamed on the capacity gaps of the African Union forces (now known as ATMIS) is that they liberated many territories Shabaabs occupied in the south of the country, only to abandon them and let the terrorists back in. And when al-Shabaab returned, they were more brutal’ chopping off limbs of suspected informers, blockading villages and taxing them and felling trees for charcoal. In turn, villagers were bamboozled into some Stockholm Syndrome, where you love your kidnapper, pay the extortion ‘tax,’ use their kangaroo courts to solve cases at a fee, and praise them so that you live longer.

As usual, it is easier to win and harder to use or retain the victory. Once those villages are repossessed, the harder bit will begin. Somalia will need stronger security agencies to guard them against jealously. It will need infrastructure; good roads, good schools, better clinics, and good communication facilities.

Failure to do that may make villagers feel like life under al-Shabaab was better than what the government promised.

The other bit is what to do with the vigilantes once the war on al-Shabaab is over. Will the government give them formal training to join the army? Will they give them alternative opportunities to make a living? Defeating al-Shabaab can feel nice, but it could also entice the militias fighting alongside government forces to demand more and maybe become a threat to their success.

Perhaps the beginning point can be to ensure the chain of command flows clearly and is managed by a central council, say a collaboration council between militias and the army.

GAROWE ONLINE