REPORT: How to reform Somalia's fragile security sector

Somali soldiers, known as African Eagles, are trained in the Anatolia Barracks of the Turkish Armed Forces in Mogadishu, Somalia, Aug.23, 2022. (AA Photo)

MOGADISHU, Somalia - To defeat Al-Shabaab and other violent extremist groups in Somalia, the country ought to take bold yet painful steps towards reforming the security sector, a report published by the Heritage Institute of Policy Studies [HIPS] avers, noting that such measures would radically improve the situation in the Horn of Africa nation.

On Wednesday, heads of state and governments from across the Horn of Africa, mainly Kenya, and Ethiopia, will be joining defense ministers and military chiefs in Mogadishu to discuss gains made in the Al-Shabaab war. The Al-Shabaab is the main threat to Somalia's stability.

The HIPS now notes that coordinating the movements and operations of thousands of troops from a variety of official and unofficial forces places a premium on effective command and control structures and situational awareness. The FGS should make it a key priority to improve the relevant structures in its security sector reform programs.

Somalia, the report says, should create a single Somali boot camp within the country where all new recruits undergo their first, official basic military training. After graduating from this boot camp, they could then embark on external or other training programs.

Lack of coordination has been the main hindrance in the security sector since dozens of the current Somali National Army [SNA] are trained by different factions and there has been no effort to amalgamate the force towards execution of the missions. On Tuesday, Somalia said it had sent 6000 soldiers for further training in Eritrea and Uganda.

But the Somalia-based Think Tank notes that Mogadishu and federal member states leaders should make an explicit declaration that they will not politicize the Somali security forces by using them as tools to repress legitimate domestic political opponents and civilian demonstrations. "Strong disciplinary action should be taken against any security personnel that commits crimes against civilians," the report reads.

"More attention and resources must be devoted to building the institutions and infrastructure required to support the SNA and other Somali security services, beyond simply training and equipping the forces," read the report. "Priorities should include an adequately resourced and staffed Ministry of Defense as well as resources for basic education, medical care, and pensions for security personnel."

One urgent operational priority is the development of suitable stabilization or “hold” forces to help deliver a genuine peace dividend to the local populations in settlements recovered from al-Shabaab, the report adds. The Macawisley are ill-suited to play this role over the longer term. "The federal government and member states must prepare “hold” forces and provide intensive training."

In addition, a second operational priority should be for the FGS to recommend and support the use of field advisors and mentors for all its external security force assistance programs. Currently, it is only the United States that provides such field support for troops trained in its programs. All other external partners run what can be described as “train and release” programs, which are not as effective.

Another key operational priority in the handover from ATMIS to the Somali security forces, HIPS argues, must be the development of new FOB locations that align with SNA priorities and needs. This process will require good coordination between the Somali forces, ATMIS, and UNSOS.

As Somalia’s two most important external security partners, it is particularly important for the United States and Turkey to closely coordinate their security force assistance programs for Somalia. This may require a new mechanism beyond the existing CAS framework.

"The FGS and FMS must start planning for increasing the roles of non-military elements in Somalia’s national security architecture, especially law enforcement and maritime capabilities," adds the report. "The authorities should clarify what size and type of army they can afford without major reliance on external financiers. Any other approach is unsustainable."

This is linked to the question of how Somalia should balance the military and non-military elements of its national security services, bearing in mind that once the war against al-Shabaab is over, Somalia’s security challenges will require primarily non-military law-enforcement capabilities, HIPS concluded.

GAROWE ONLINE