Funding Cuts, Leadership Changes Hamper Somali Army’s Fight Against Al-Shabaab

MOGADISHU, Somalia - Over the last few weeks, the Somali National Army (SNA) has failed to fully take control of various frontlines. The loss of Adan Yabaal perhaps gives a clearer indication of a weak force struggling to stamp authority despite massive investment by the international partners in the force.

Now, racing against time and with key financiers led by the US contemplating a drastic cut of the budget for mission peacekeepers and the local forces, the Somali National Army is under pressure to take over security responsibilities, not until it shows its defence capabilities and mission readiness attitude.

Antonio Guiterres, the United Nations Secretary General, predicts that the resources for payment of soldiers are first diminishing, with no guarantee that the US and other multinational funders would be committed to the mission. There is no indication that stability could be realised in Somalia.

Recently, the Troops Contributing Countries met in Kampala, Uganda and agreed to have at least 8,000 more soldiers dispatched to Somalia — at the time, the UN is keeping downsize the force and invest in local forces ahead of exit. This even draws uncertainties.

Samira Gaid, a security analyst, says misplaced political imperatives should be blamed for SNA inefficiencies, with politicians failing to give the military ample time to organise operations for effective execution.

"The anti-AS operations in 2022, which began spontaneously, were initially led by communities, but it was expected that the offensives would naturally transition to military leadership," she says. "Unfortunately, that never came to pass; the military was sidestepped, and the war effort was led at the highest levels, with objectives determined and targets set by politicians for political ends—without adequate planning or qualified military strategy."

"Many other factors also came into play: logistical challenges, changes in security leadership at critical times, and the use of hastily trained forces rather than older, more knowledgeable units, among others," Samira Gaid further says.

Asked if there is a possibility of SNA troops taking security responsibilities shortly, Samira says 'I cannot tell' while citing failures of the military in various frontlines, while insisting that the force has been degraded as opposed to five years ago when there was a plan.

Changes in military leadership under Hassan Sheikh Mohamud have also impacted the execution and strategy, further diminishing the SNA's chances. A few months ago, Hassan Sheikh sacked General Odowaa Yusuf Rage, but only to reinstate him a few weeks ago following challenges on the frontlines.

But despite the challenges, the government has also invested in religious scholars for the anti-radicalisation mission, besides blocking sources of finance for the group, starving them significantly. Websites and social media sites used for propaganda have been locked, too.

Another tussle is Al-Shabaab's change of strategy – the group is keen to endear itself to the civilians by pretending to offer alternative leadership, further making it harder for the government and the military to counter them. As a result, civilians in some sections are embracing Al-Shabaab leadership.

"They appeared less punitive than in previous campaigns against known and suspected collaborators of the Somali government and security forces, with Adan Yabaal being the only exception. They reportedly made calculated concessions, such as allowing clans to retain arms and offering “tax” breaks, she says.

"This shift appeared aimed at regaining the trust of communities—or at least reducing resistance to their presence. We also didn’t see the gory images and videos of beheadings of captured security personnel that they had previously circulated. All in all, they seemed to have shifted their political approach, blending in co-option as a means of regaining access."

The administration of Hassan Sheikh is blamed for focusing too much on political situations in Somalia instead of diverting attention to the al-Shabaab war. Whether or not the war would be waged militarily, the general strategic approach was mutilated, and there is a need for a deliberate change in strategy.

GAROWE ONLINE